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Article 3

The Use of Mutual Fund Assets to Pay Marketing
Costs
JOHN P. FREEMAN*
INTRODUCTION

Managements of few companies would find it difficult to obtain
or defend approval of an annual allocation of .2 percent of net assets
to a marketing program expected to increase sales and benefit
shareholders. In the mutual fund industry the picture is different.
In that industry, pressure exerted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission traditionally has prevented overt adoption of the normal practice of charging corporate assets to pay marketing costs.
However, many funds are engaging in the practice indirectly,' and,
despite its traditional opposition, the SEC occasionally has allowed
certain funds to pay marketing costs.'
This article analyzes both sides of the ongoing debate between the
SEC and the fund industry whether it is proper, under the Investment Company Act of 1940,1 to use mutual fund assets as a source
of payment for fund marketing costs. In addition, this article discusses a significant legal problem that has been glossed over by both
the SEC and the fund industry-the continuing nondisclosure by
the industry of the indirect use of assets for marketing costs. To aid
understanding of the issues considered in this article, the following
sections present an introductory discussion of the contours of the
mutual fund industry and the history of the debate between it and
the SEC.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.B.A., 1967; J.D., 1970, University of Notre Dame; LL.M., 1976, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Ohio and South
Carolina Bars.
During the summers of 1974 and 1975 the author worked with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on matters related to mutual fund marketing. The views expressed herein do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or the Commission's staff. The author wishes
to express his thanks to Wilkins Byrd for his very fine research assistance. This article bears
a date of February 1, 1978.
1. Indirect use of fund assets to pay marketing costs arises when a portion of a fund's
advisory fee is used to pay for marketing expenses. Such allocation of advisory fees is said to
be common. See note 18 infra. The SEC historically has acquiesced in such action on the
theory that marketing expenses are being paid out of advisors' profits. See note 126 infra and
accompanying text.
2. SEC action authorizing certain schemes whereby fund shareholders would bear marketing costs is discussed in notes 30, 32, 36 & 37 infra and accompanying text.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970).
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THE BUSINESS SETTING

The mutual fund industry consists of approximately 1200 companies4 having roughly 7.5 million shareholders' and total assets of
approximately $50 billion.' Mutual funds differ markedly from regular business corporations in the ways they are regulated and managed. Regulation is both intensive and far-reaching. As one former
SEC Chairman has observed: "No issuer of securities is subject to
more detailed regulation than mutual funds." 7 The chief piece of
regulatory legislation for the fund industry is the Investment Company Act of 1940, although fund operations are also affected by the
other federal securities laws, blue sky laws, state corporate laws,
and common law fiduciary duty principles.8
A mutual fund consists of a pool of assets in the form of securities.9 Fund shareholders have pro-rata claims on the portfolio securities. In buying fund shares, an investor purchases three things: professional investment management, diversification of investment
risk and a redeemable security. This latter feature means that unlike most securities, which are traded in secondary markets, fund
shares are redeemed by the funds themselves for their net asset
value at the time of redemption, less any redemption fee. The redemption feature is significant because unless a fund has a successful marketing program to attract new investors, it eventually will be
redeemed out of existence.
Unlike a regular business corporation whose affairs are
"internally managed" by its officers and board of directors, the
assets of most mutual funds are externally managed by an investment adviser who is hired by a single fund or by members of an
affiliated group of funds. Such an affiliated group is called a fund
"complex." Approximately one-half of the industry's assets are con4. SEC, 1976

ANNUAL REPORT

189 (table 10) (1976).

5. This is the number of shareholders owning stock in mutual funds that belong to the
Investment Company Institute, the fund industry's trade association. The assets of members
of the Institute represent about 90% of the fund industry's assets. See Statement of the
Investment Company Institute, SEC File No. 4-186, at 1 (Nov. 1976).

6. SEC, 1976

ANNUAL REPORT

189 (table 10) (1976).

7. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman (Nov. 4, 1974),
at v, reprinted in FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 559, pt. 11(Nov. 8, 1974).
8. For evidence of a judicial willingness to apply common law fiduciary duty principles
in 1940 Act cases, see Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 802 (1972).
9. For a recent discussion that presents basic background information concerning the fund
industry and the way it is regulated, see Krupsky, The Role of Investment Company
Directors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1977). A much more extensive but less current analysis of the
industry is found in The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Survey].
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centrated in ten large fund complexes." Besides rendering investment advice to a mutual fund, the adviser often furnishes the fund
with a broad array of administrative and clerical services, even to
the point of providing the fund's office space." The adviser is compensated for services rendered by a management fee which normally
is calculated as a percentage of the fund's average net assets. The
most common annual fee is .5 percent of fund average net assets up
to a certain specified level, with provision for a sliding-scale reduction of the percentage as assets increase.12
The marketing of fund assets to new investors is ordinarily handled by the fund's "principal underwriter," which is usually the
adviser or an affiliate of the adviser. In rare cases, the fund itself
acts as underwriter of its shares. 3 Shares generally are sold to the
public in one of two ways: (1) the underwriter selects dealers who
then sell to the public and collect a sales charge (the "load"); or (2)
the shares are sold directly to the public at no sales charge. Funds
following the latter practice, called "no-load" funds, account for
approximately twenty percent of the industry's assets." The load
rarely accrues to the fund. 5 Rather, the load is purely compensation
for marketing effort, and typically is split between the principal
10.
AND

SEC DIVISION Op INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION, MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION
SECTION 22(D) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 17 n.3 (1974) [hereinafter cited

as DMsTBUTION REPORT]. Indeed, it has been noted that a complex, rather than an individual

fund, is the "relevant unit" in the investment company industry today. Statement of the
Vanguard Group of Investment Companies, SEC File No. 4-168, at 10 (Nov. 22, 1976). Besides
sharing a common investment adviser, the member funds of a complex normally share the
same corporate management and the same principal underwriter. Id. Practical aspects of
fund complex operations are discussed in Bogle, The Mutual Fund Complex, 3 REV. SEC. REG.
911 (1970). An in-depth legal analysis is presented in Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund
Complexes, 119 U.

PA.

L. REv. 205 (1970).

11. See Survey, supra note 9, at 885-86, 891. Among the many services that may be
supplied to the fund by its adviser are accounting, auditing and legal services, payment of
registration and filing fees, payment for stationery, supplies, printing costs and executives'
salaries. For a checklist of services that may be provided to a fund by its adviser, see SEC
Form N-1R, Item 1.22, reprinted in 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 51,963 at 39,847.
12. WMSENBMWER INVETMENr COMPANIES SERVICE, INVESTMENT CoMPANIFs 1977 14. See
also note 42 infra and accompanying text (discussing money market fund management fees).
13. For two instances of the practice, see correspondence accompanying SEC Staff NoAction Letter to Pegasus Fund, Inc. (May 21, 1975); Prospectus of Ivy Fund, Inc., April 30,
1977, at 2.
14.

SEC, 1976 ANNuAL REPoir 189 (table 10) (1976).

15.

An extensive study of the mutual fund industry published 12 years ago did note that

several funds charged low sales loads and kept the loads. See RPoRT OF THE SEcum'rIEs AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUUBUC POUCY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT CoMPANY GROWTH,

H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 n.124, 207 n.26 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLlC
POLICY REPORT]. The only fund mentioned by name in the report as charging and keeping a
load was Growth Industry Shares, Inc. Id. at 52 n.124. That fund is now a no-load fund. See
Prospectus of Growth Industry Shares, Inc., April 29, 1977.
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underwriter, the retail dealer, and sales personnel of the dealer.'"
Externalized management is the chief operating characteristic
which distinguishes the fund industry. Ordinarily, the external investment adviser organizes the fund or complex and, through the
fund's board and by control of the proxy mechanism, controls the
fund. Former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen pointed this out eleven
years ago in the course of hearings on proposed mutual fund legislation. Referring to testimony by fund investment advisers he said:
They also made the point that the investment adviser creates
the fund, and operates it, in effect, as a business. Many of them
stated that "it is our fund, we run it, we manage it, we control it,"
and I don't think there is anything wrong in them saying it. They
were just admitting what is a fact of life.
The investment adviser does control the fund.'7
The fact of external adviser control paired with the fact that adviser
compensation pursuant to board-approved contracts normally is
based on a percentage of total net assets leads to an understanding
of the SEC's reluctance to authorize use of fund assets to subsidize
sales of fund shares. The benefit to the adviser, the dominant party,
is easy to see; much less clear is the nature and extent of any benefits flowing to fund shareholders from increased sales.
If the conflict of interest problem is obvious, so is another facet
of the problem: a substantial amount of money is involved. If the
SEC permitted direct use of fund assets to pay marketing costs,
fund expenses conceivably could rise by the seemingly miniscule .2
percent mentioned in the first sentence of this article. An annual
charge of .2 percent applied against the fund industry's asset base
of $50 billion yields an annual drain on fund investors' capital of
$100 million.
This discussion would be incomplete if it failed to reiterate a vital
fact noted in the introduction: the assets of mutual funds currently
are being used to pay for fund marketing costs.' 8 Indeed, for the
16. Some funds sell their shares to the public by means of their own "captive" sales forces.
One fund complex has a captive sales force numbering 3,100 sales personnel. See Statement
of Hamer H. Budge, SEC File No. 4-186, at 1 (1976).
17. Hearings on H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. of Commerce and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at

674 (1967). For a statement by Chief Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit to the same effect,
see Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. See Proposed Statement of John C. Bogle before the Securities and Exchange Commission Hearing on the Vanguard Distribution Application 32 (Jan. 5, 1978) (copy on file with
the Loyola Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Vanguard Statement]:
[W]e want to reemphasize that in the conventional mutual fund complex today,
the aggregate management or advisory fees generated by the funds as a group
provide substantially all of the resources expended for the distribution of each fund
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many no-load funds, the absence of a sales charge makes it absolutely essential that a portion of the management fee be used to pay
indirectly for marketing costs." For the load funds, fund assets likewise are used to pay indirectly for distribution, by use of management fee revenue to offset losses incurred in distribution activities. 0
The direct allocation of assets by load or no-load funds to pay marketing costs rarely occurs.2 Whether it is proper under the 1940 Act
or rule 14a-9 under the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 to mask
appropriations for marketing ventures as part of the management
fee payment presents a nice legal question considered later in this
article. For present purposes it is enough to note that the practice
of using fund assets to pay marketing costs exists and apparently is
widespread.
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

The SEC's activism in investment company marketing matters is
well documented.2 3 Many areas have received close scrutiny, occasionally to the point of absurdity, such as the Commission's decision
to dictate the type size and style required in legends in fund tombstone ads. 24 In contrast, the Commission's participation in the conin the group. In the case of no-load funds, all of the resources allocated to distribution are provided by these fees, since no other revenues are generated. In the case
of funds with sales commissions, most of the distribution costs are financed by such
management fees, since the sales concession revenues retained by the adviser are
almost always wholly inadequate to cover these costs. Therefore, the proposed
Vanguard arrangements for the joint sharing of distribution costs do not depart
from present industry practice. They merely make explicit (with the commensurate
benefits of full disclosure) what is already implicit in the financing of mutual fund
distribution on an industry-wide basis.
The simple fact of the matter is that mutual fund shareholders are the sole source
of financing all mutual fund activities-whether administration, advisory, or distribution.
The Proposed Vanguard Statement indicates that assets of the Vanguard complex of funds
have been used, and are being used, to pay marketing costs of over $1 million annually. Id.
at 49.
19.

See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THiRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 356

(R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer eds. 1972).
20. See DImTRIBUTION REPORT, supra note 10, at 20, 30-31.
21. For instances where the practice was attacked by the SEC, see note 35 infra and
accompanying text. A more recent abortive attempt by a no-load fund to implement the
practice is discussed in the text accompanying notes 41-49 infra. Data concerning 17 funds
that have engaged in the practice is presented in Proposed Vanguard Statement, supra note
18, at Exhibit III.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977).
23. See generally DISTRIBUTION REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-8, and reports cited therein;
Freeman, Marketing Mutual Funds and Individual Life Insurance, 28 S.C.L. REv. 1, 79-118
(1976).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(iii)(G) (1975) (requiring the use of 12-point boldface
type in certain legends), amended by SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8824 (June
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troversy explored here has been reluctant and tentative. Surprisingly, the legal implications of the practice escaped close study by
the Commission until quite recently.
Until the publication of its landmark 1966 report, entitled Public
Policy Implicationsof Investment Company Growth, 5 the SEC paid
only scant attention to the precise problem confronted in this article. 2 The report did not present detailed analysis of the problem,
but it did note in passing that it is not uncommon for a fund's
resources to be used to promote sales.Y It also pointed out that a
mutual fund managed by E.W. Axe & Co., Inc., bore an effective
charge of .13 percent against fund assets in the form of "continuing
fee" payments for marketing costs. The fee was payable to Axe
Securities Corp., an affiliate of the investment adviser. Although
the report expressed no judgment as to the legality of the continuing
fee practice,2 it did explore the closely analogous issueof the propriety of allocating brokerage commissions generated by fund portfolio transactions to stimulate sales. On this point the report echoed
earlier Commission criticism of the use of mutual fund reciprocal
business and customer-directed give-ups to generate sales rather
2
than to reduce advisory fees paid by the funds.
In the early 1970's the outlines of the present controversy began
to take form. In 1971 the Commission's Division of Investam'ent Management granted a no-action request which, in effect, permitted an
externally managed no-load fund to bear its own distribution expenses.30 In February of 1972 the Commission's position crystalized fur16, 1975). The amendment was made after it came to the Commission's attention that, among
other things, the type-size requirement might discourage the use of small advertisements. The
result would be to discriminate against distributors unable to afford large ads.
25. See PuBuc POLICY REPORT, note 15 supra.
26. An earlier extensive analysis of mutual fund marketing practices conducted on behalf
of the SEC presented only a brief analysis of "the extent to which, if at all, the advisory
function of certain firms is subsidizing the underwriting function, or vice versa." See
WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32, 514-17 (1962).
27. PuBuc PoucY REPORT, supra note 15, at 201; cf. id. at 122-25, 209 (discussing fund
profits and losses from distribution and advisory activities).
28. See id. at 93-94.
29. See id. at 172-73. In its PUBuc PoucY REPORT criticism of reciprocal and give-up
practices, the Commission was embracing the position it previously took in SEC, REPORT OF
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 23435 (1963).
30. SEC No-Action Letter to First Safe Fund (Dec. 8, 1971), [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
MUT. FUNDS GUIDE (CCH)
9376. The staffs response did not present an exlaustive review
of the legal aspects of the proposed marketing plan, other than to note that a fund could'serve
as its own distributor under § 12(b) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(b) (1970). For an
earlier Commission ruling allowing a fund to bear distribution costs, see Institutional Investors Mutual Fund, Inc., 35 S.E.C. 72 (1953).
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ther when, in its Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, it opined that mutual fund selling costs should be
borne by investors who purchase the fund shares, "and not, even in
part, by the existing shareholders of the fund who often receive little
or no benefit from the sale of new shares."'" In April of the same
year, the Commission retreated from its Future Structure pronouncement when, by granting an application for exemptions from
certain provisions of the 1940 Act, it allowed four load mutual funds
in a complex to pay distribution expenses out of assets. 2 The funds
were internally managed, in the sense that, together with an affiliated closed-end fund," they owned all the stock of their investment
adviser.34 One year later, however, the Commission's staff twice took
very restrictive interpretative positions with respect to inquiries
concerning the propriety of using investment company assets to
compensate sales personnel. 5 Both inquiries involved the normal
situation of load funds controlled by their external advisers. One of
the requests, filed on behalf of the Axe-Houghton funds, involved
the distribution scheme which the Commission had noticed and
failed to condemn seven years earlier in the Public Policy
Implications study. In both cases the staff took the position that use
of assets to compensate sales personnel would violate the 1940 Act.
In 1975, the Commission's Division of Investment Management
departed two more times from its hard line approach. In May the
staff granted a no-action request permitting three affiliated inter31. SEC, STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (Feb. 1972),
reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 137, pt. II, at 7.
32. See SEC Investment Company Act Release Nos. 7114 & 7117 (April 4, 1972). The
order permitted the companies to own their principal underwriter.
33. Basically, a closed-end fund is like a mutual fund, except that it does not offer or have
outstanding a redeemable security. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-5 (1970).
34. "Internal management" has been described as
a rather slippery phrase . . . . [lit could mean that the fund's portfolio management and maybe all other services for the fund are performed by its own salaried
employees. Or it could mean that if there is an external investment adviser, all
services other than investment advice are performed by someone else.
Jones, Payment of Sales and Promotional Expenses by Mutual Funds, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM
9, 18 (June 1977). An example of the first type of internalized management is that of the
Broad Street Group discussed in the releases cited in note 32 supra. The investment companies in the Broad Street Group own their adviser and underwriter. An example of the second
type of internalized management is the Vanguard Group, discussed in Jones, Mutual Fund
Distribution and the State of Policy, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM 1, 2 (Oct. 1977). For cogent
argument in favor of allowing funds to internalize all functions other than advisory services,
see Proposed Vanguard Statement, supra note 18, at 41-42, 45.
35. Letter from SEC Staff to Hoch Reid (Nov. 15, 1973) (copy on file with the Loyola Law
Journal); Letter from SEC Staff to Terry & Saxton, Inc. (Sept. 7, 1973), reprinted in [19731976 Transfer Binder] Mtrr. FU'NDS GUIDE (CCH) 9885.
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nally managed funds to distribute their shares on a no-load basis. 6
In August of 1975 the staff gave a qualified no-action letter to Armstrong Associates, Inc., an externally managed no-load fund that
intended to use a portion of its management fee to pay continuing
3
sales compensation to broker-dealers.
Thus, despite the stern language used in its Future Structure
statement, by 1976 the Commission or its staff had considered and
not objected to plans involving the use of fund assets to pay for
distribution advanced by two different externally managed no-load
funds, a complex containing four internally managed load funds,
and a group of internally managed no-load funds. However, for the
most common type of fund, the externally managed load fund, the
teaching of the FutureStructure statement was held applicable and
controlling.
For purposes of this discussion, it is also pertinent to note that in
1974, the Commission's Division of Investment Management completed a comprehensive report on mutual fund distribution.3 8 Although the report made clear that distribution of fund shares was
39
becoming a money-losing proposition for the fund industry, it
stated no conclusion about proper sources of payments for marketing costs. Indeed, the propriety of using fund assets to pay for distribution was side-stepped entirely in the text of the report, although
a footnote indicated that the issue was under review by the staff.4 0
In 1976, concern over the propriety of using fund assets to pay for
distribution intensified substantially. The catalyst for change was
a no-action letter given to Mutual Liquid Assets, Inc. by the Commission's Division of Investment Management.4 ' On May 14, 1976,
Mutual Liquid Assets filed a registration statement seeking to
commence operations as a no-load money market fund. The man36. SEC Staff No-Action Letter to Pegasus Fund, Inc. (May 21, 1975). The factual setting
for the Pegasus no-action request was unique in that the funds had been abused by their
former management, and at the time the request was granted a majority of the funds' directors and the special counsel of the funds were court-appointed. This was pointed out in the
no-action letter. The factual background concerning the request is described in extensive
correspondence included in the public file with the no-action letter.
37. SEC No-Action Letter to Armstrong Associates, Inc. (Aug. 19, 1975) (copy on file with
the Loyola Law Journal). The qualifications were that: (1) full disclosure of the plan be made
in proxy statements and the fund's prospectus; (2) the advisory fee not be raised; (3) the
board, including a majority of the disinterested directors, approve the plan; and (4) the ability of the adviser to fulfill its obligations not be adversely affected by the continuing compensation arrangements.
38. See DISTMUTION REPORT, supra note 10.
39. Id. at 20, 30-31.
40. Id. at 10 n.1.
41. SEC No-Action Letter to Mutual Liquid Assets, Inc., (June 15, 1976), reprinted in
11976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,667, at 86,730.
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agement fee was set at .5 percent of net assets, the fee customarily
charged by investment advisers for other money market funds.2 In
its no-action request the fund announced its intention to
"reallocate" one-half of the advisory fee (.25 percent) to dealers
selling the fund. This reallocation procedure, like the one involved
in the Armstrong Associates no-action letter, constitutes an innovative approach to no-load fund promotion, which traditionally has
been built around advertising and direct mail solicitation.4 3
In its request for a no-action letter, Mutual Liquid Assets stated
its intention to make prospectus disclosure of the practice to fund
shareholders at the time they invested and periodically thereafter.
The request also pointed out that, from a cost standpoint, the effect
of the proposed practice on fund shareholders would not differ from
customary money market fund practice: "We understand that in
many instances a substantial percentage of the management fee is
allocated to advertising and promotional expenses."4 4
In essence, the Mutual Liquid Assets no-action request presented
an opportunity to move the practice of using fund assets for marketing costs out of the closet. The staff's response indicated that if the
management of Mutual Liquid Assets had nerve enough to fully and
fairly disclose what they planned to do with fund shareholders'
money, then the Division of Investment Management had nerve
enough to let them. The no-action request was granted with two
qualifications. First, the fund was informed that the question of use
of fund assets for distribution was still under review by the staff and
it was assumed that Mutual Liquid Assets would modify its practices if it was later determined by the staff that the practices did
not comport with the 1940 Act. Second, the no-action response was
premised on the assumption of full disclosure to the fund's directors
of the "uncertain legal status" of the distribution payment
scheme."5
The staff's no-action letter quickly received the attention of the
fund industry. In a letter "on a matter of extreme urgency" that was
42. Id. at 86,731. The letter noted than an examination of 42 money market funds showed
that 28 imposed a flat .5% charge, 4 imposed a fee of .5% with a sliding-scale fee reduction
for higher asset levels, 8 imposed a fee of less than .5% and 2 levied a fee of more than .5%.
In the fund industry as a whole, the use of sliding-scale reductions is more prevalent than in
the money market segment. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
43. See Statement of Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., SEC File No. 4-186, at 5
n.2 (Dec. 7, 1976). The statement describes a marketing scheme advocated by Merrill Lynch
Asset Management along the lines of the Mutual Liquid Assets approach.
44. SEC No-Action Letter to Mutual Liquid Assets, Inc. (June 15, 1976), supra note 41,
at 86,731.
45. Id. at 86,730.
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hand-carried to the SEC, the Investment Company Institute's senior vice president and general counsel complained that the staff had
made "apparent changes in the ground rules" dealing with payment
for fund marketing costs in the absence of a public expression by
the Commission through promulgation of a rule or a release.4" The
complaint was not that the no-action letter to Mutual Liquid Assets
was inappropriate as a legal matter. Rather, it was that the staff's
ad hoc determination was improper because it granted an unfair
competitive advantage in the form of a "head start" to the no-action
letter recipient. 7 Of course, until publication of the Mutual Liquid
Assets no-action letter, SEC action on the question had consisted
of nothing but sporadic ad hoc rulings. Indeed, the basic question
confronted in the Mutual Liquid Assets letter had been dealt with
a year earlier in the staff response to the Armstrong Associates
request. The only major difference between the two situations was
that Armstrong Associates was an existing fund while Mutual Liquid Assets was a new one.
Industry criticism perhaps contributed to a later Commission
directive that the staff not grant a request for acceleration of the
Mutual Liquid Assets registration statement. 8 It also may have
been a factor in the Commission's decision to convene hearings
announced in a release dated October 4, 1976,11 inquiring into the
propriety of arrangements under which mutual funds would bear
distribution costs. The stated purpose of the hearings was to assist
the Commission in giving guidance to the mutual fund industry on
the propriety of using fund assets to finance advertising, dealer
compensation, and other distribution expenses. The release defined
twenty issues to be probed at the hearings, and it pointedly stated
that, "in view of the hearings," the Commission had instructed the
staff to withdraw the Mutual Liquid Assets no-action letter. However, the Armstrong Associates no-action letter has still not been
withdrawn.
Nearly one year later, long after the end of the 1976 hearings and
more than three years after the footnote disclosure that the staff was
reviewing whether fund shareholders should bear selling expenses,
the Commission issued another release stating that its review of the
matters considered at the 1976 hearings was incomplete and that,
46.
47.
48.
49.

Letter from David Silver to SEC (June 29, 1976), at 1.
Id. at 3.
See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 9470 (September 30, 1976).
Id.
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[a]ccordingly, the Commission has no reason at this time to
change its previous position that it is generally improper under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 . . . for mutual funds to use
their assets, directly or indirectly, to finance the distribution of
their shares. Therefore, directors, officers and investment advisers
which authorize mutual funds to bear the expenses of distribution
will be doing so at their risk.'
Thus, at the present time, there is substantial disorder. According
to the Mutual Liquid Assets no-action request and other documentary evidence, the use of fund assets to pay for distribution is widespread, 5 even though, according to the SEC, the practice "is generally improper under the Investment Company Act." From the following analysis of various legal and policy arguments concerning the
practice, both pro and con, it will be seen that there is a substantial
amount of worthless rhetoric on either side of the question, with
neither side packing a knockout punch. It will also be seen that a
major issue has been ignored by the debaters.
THE DEBATE OVER USE OF ASSETS FOR MARKETING UNDER THE

1940

ACT

If fund directors are not to be permitted to exercise their business
judgment in deciding whether to allocate assets to pay for distribution costs, then some provision of the 1940 Act must be found to
stand in the way. The SEC has cited numerous provisions as militating against the practice.
Assignment of the Advisory Contract
One SEC argument is that the payment of a portion of a fund's
management fee to sales personnel constitutes an "assignment" of
the adviser's advisory contract under section 15(a),11 thereby requiring, among other things, new approval of the contract by shareholders each time there is a change in sales force personnel.13 The assign50. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 9915 (August 31, 1977), reprinted in 2
MuT. FuNDs GUIDE (CCH) 110,562, at 14,299-300.
51. See, e.g., Statement on Behalf of Lionel D. Edie & Co., SEC File No. 4-186, at 5 (Nov.
29, 1976); Statement of Merrill Lynch Asset Management, supra note 43, at 10, 16; Statement
on Behalf of the Oppenheimer Group, SEC File No. 4-186, at 7 (Nov. 30, 1976). See also note
18 supra.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970). Under the section, the advisory contract must provide
for its automatic termination in the event of assignment. Section 2(a)(4) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(a)(4) (1970), defines "assignment" as including "any direct or indirect transfer or
hypothecation of a contract or chose in action ....
"
53. If the advisory contract is terminated by an assignment of it, shareholder approval of
the new contract is required under § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970).
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ment argument was made in a 1973 interpretive letter from the
staff. 4 It has not been advocated in public since, with good reason.5
Sales Load Theories
1.

Section 22(d)

Two slightly less gossamer staff arguments are premised on section 22(d) of the Act. 6 Central to each argument is the proposition
that the assessment of charges against assets for marketing costs
constitutes the imposition of a sales load under section 2(a)(35) of
the Act. 7 According to one interpretation, the use of assets to pay
for sales effort results in "hidden sales loads" violative of section
22(d) .51 The second section 22(d) argument is that the practice is
illegal since it causes loads to be borne by shareholders in an irrational and discriminatory manner, i.e., based on length of time of
shareholder status, in contravention of the section 22(d) requirement that loads not be unfairly discriminatory. 9
Both of these arguments can be countered. The hidden sales load
claim is disposed of if full disclosure of any asset charge for distribution is made in the fund's prospectus and proxy statements, as in
the Armstrong Associates and Mutual Liquid Assets plans. One
plausible response to the irrational-discrimination argument is that,
assuming marketing expenditures benefit shareholders (and this is
the pivotal assumption), then it is rational for people who enjoy the
benefits the longest to pay the most. 0 A major weakness of both
54. Letter from SEC Staff to Terry & Saxton, Inc. (Sept. 7, 1973), reprinted in [19731976 Transfer Binder] MuT. FUNDS GUME (CCH) 9885.
55. The argument, quite obviously, is hash. It is true that the drafters of the 1940 Act
clearly intended to protect investment company shareholders from harm caused by changes
in control or management. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(6) (1970). But under the arrangement
in question, the same adviser continues at all times to perform the advisory and management
functions it agreed to perform pursuant to the contract. No assignment of the contract has
actually occurred. See Statement of Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., supra note 43,
at 13-14; Statement of Waddell & Reed, Inc., SEC File No. 4-186, at 14 (Dec. 6, 1976). It is
worth noting that the Mutual Liquid Assets letter requesting a no-action position expressly
argued against the applicability of § 15(a). See SEC No-Action Letter to Mutual Liquid
Assets, Inc., reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,667, at
86,730, 86,732.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970).
57. Id. § 80a-2(a)(35).
58. See Letter from SEC Staff to Hoch Reid, supra note 28, at 4. The usage of disguised
loads by investment company sponsors was a matter of concern at the time the 1940 Act was
being considered. See SEC, COMPANIES SPONSORING INSTALLMENT INVESTMENT PLANS, H.R.
Doc. No. 482, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., at 84-89 (1939); Hearings on H.R. 10065 before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13134 (1940).
59. Letter from SEC Staff to Hoch Reid, supra note 35, at 4.
60. The SEC's broad anti-unfair discrimination interpretation of § 22(d) is questioned in
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22(d) arguments is that the assumption that distribution charges
constitute sales loads under the Act is highly questionable. The
statutory definition"' of "sales load" and its legislative history suggest the contrary. 2 Moreover, it is noteworthy that section 10(d) of
the Act6" refers separately to, and appears to distinguish between, a
fund's charging a "sales load" and its incurring "sales or promotion
expenses." 4 If the drafters of the Act meant the latter to be coextensive with the former, the separate treatment in section 10(d)
is hard to explain. Section 10(d) has also been cited by the Investment Company Institute in support of its claim that sales and promotional expenses can be borne by funds. According to the Institute, that section, which expressly prohibits a certain type of noload fund from charging sales loads and bearing "sales or promotion
expenses," implicitly recognizes that such expenses may be borne
by funds not covered by the section. 5
2.

Rule 22c-1

The idea that asset payments for distribution are "sales loads"
is also the foundation for another SEC argument based on the 1940
Act. This argument is that commitments by funds to pay a portion
Freeman, supra note 23, at 101 n.317, 102-03 n.320, 111 n.340.
61. The definition of "sales load" is found, in relevant part, in § 2(a)(35) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(35) (1970):
"Sales load" means the difference between the price of a security to the public and
that portion of the proceeds from its sale which is received and invested or held for
investment by the issuer (or in the case of a unit investment trust, by the depositor
or trustee), less any portion of such difference deducted for trustee's or custodian's
fees, insurance premiums, issue taxes, or administrative expenses or fees which are
not properly chargeable to sales or promotional activities.
At least one reputable law firm formally has expressed its legal opinion that § 2(a)(35)
regulates only charges "by the selling broker ... at the time of purchase." Letter of Sullivan
and Worcester to Boards of Directors of Investors Group of Companies (Nov. 5, 1976), at 3
(copy on file with the Loyola Law Journal).
62. See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Banking and Currency
Comm., 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt.2, at 799 (1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Senate Hearings],
where the load was described by an SEC official as the difference between the "amount paid
by the investor and the amount which the investment trust received." In an interpretive letter
written by the staff in 1975, it was claimed that neither the Commission nor the staff has
ever "taken the position that the payment of [sales and promotional expenses] from fund
assets necessarily would constitute a sales load." Letter from SEC Staff to Steadman Security
Corp., (May 22, 1975), reprinted in [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] MuT. FUNDS GUIDE (CCH)
10,201. But see Letter of SEC Staff to Hoch Reid, supra note 35, at 3-4. For recent staff
waffling on the issue, see Jones, Payment of Sales and Promotional Expenses by Mutual
Funds, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM 9, 19 (June 1977) ("annual charges against assets for distribution might not be sales loads in a technical sense (that gets into a nice legal question)").
63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (1970).
64. Compare id. § 80a-10(d)(3) with id. § 80a-10(d)(5).
65. Official Transcript of SEC Hearings on Mutual Funds Distribution Expenses 27 (testimony of David Silver).
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of their assets to defray marketing costs lead to violations of rule
22c-1,11 which requires that fund shares be sold at net asset value.
The theory is that the rule's requirement of certainty in the calculation of net asset value is violated where "[n]et asset value at the
time of sale is reduced by an undetermined amount representing the
[fund's] contingent liability to its underwriter in later years." 67
One difficulty with this analysis is that it proves too much. Taken
literally, it suggests that all no-load funds, and any load funds that
have real contingent liabilities, are in violation of the 1940 Act.
Another shortcoming is that the SEC's own rule defining "net asset
value" notes the need to deduct "expenses" in computing net asset
value, yet it makes no mention of the need to take so-called
"contingent liabilities" into account. 8 Another difficulty with the
net asset value argument is the lack of substantive support for the
staff's interpretation of rule 22c-1, either in the SEC release promulgating the rule,69 the sections under which the rule was adopted, 0
or the legislative history of those sections.'
3.

Section 22(b)

The SEC is on somewhat firmer ground when it makes the argument that charges against assets to pay for distribution can lead to
excessive sales loads in violation of section 22(b).72 Congress has
indeed manifested an intent that "excessive" sales charges be pro66. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1977).
67. Letter from SEC Staff to Hoch Reid, supra note 35, at 4.
68. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (1977).
69. The rule was adopted in SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5519 (Oct. 16,
1968).
70. Rule 22c-1 was adopted under subsections 22(a) and 22(c) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-22(a), 22(c) (1970). Those sections vest the SEC and the NASD with broad rulemaking
authority, but they do not contain any substantive prohibitions, and they relate only to the
pricing of shares at the time of sale.
71. The chief wrong that §§ 22(a) and (c) were intended to redress was dilution of shareholders' investment value caused by the "two price system" that used to apply to sales of
fund shares. See United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 707-10 (1975); Survey, supra
note 9, at 790-92, 804-05.
It deserves mention that some support for the Commission's 22c-1 argument may be found
in the First Circuit's expansive reading of "net asset value" in Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369,
374 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). See also Romanski, The Role of Advertising
in the Mutual Fund Industry, 13 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. Ray. 959, 993 (1972) (SEC employeeauthor construing rule 22c-1 and Moses). The Moses interpretation has been rejected by the
Second Circuit. See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 824 (1976); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
421 (1977). The Fogel decision's treatment of Moses is probed in Deutsch, Fogel v. Chestnutt:
The Meaning of an Opinion, 4 SEc. RaG. L.J. 375 (1977).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1970). The argument is put forward in Letter from SEC Staff
to Hoch Reid, supra note 35, at 3.
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hibited, 3 and section 47(a) of the Act" prohibits devices that accomplish indirectly that which cannot be done directly. Assuming,
again, that asset charges for distribution are sales loads for purposes
of the Act, then the 22(b) argument poses a real problem, particularly in light of an Illinois appellate court case, Group Securities,
75 which upheld the Illinois Secretary of State's
Inc. v. Carpentier,
position that a load fund's payment of a continuing service fee to
dealers violated the sales load ceiling of the state's securities act.
However, the precedential value of the Carpentiercase was recently
eroded when the Illinois Secretary of State approved the Mutual
Liquid Assets continuing fee scheme. 6 Further, the 22(b) argument
is weakened by the fact that no-loads have always at least indirectly
charged assets for selling expenses, but this has never prevented
them from advertising themselves as no-loads."
Fund Industry Arguments under the 1940 Act
1.

Section 12(b)

An argument in favor of allowing assets to be used for marketing
effort revolves around section 12(b)78 of the 1940 Act. The language
of that section provides that a fund may serve as a distributor of
shares it issues and, obviously, incur costs in conjunction with that
activity unless and until the Commission prohibits such conduct by
rule or regulation. No such prohibitory rules or regulations have ever
been issued. Furthermore, in the course of House hearings prior to
approval of the 1940 Act, section 12(b) was described as protecting
mutual funds "against excessive sales, promotion expenses, and so
forth." 79 As with the Investment Company Institute's section 10(d)
argument, it may be claimed that, by negative implication, reasonable selling costs may properly be charged against fund assets. 0
73.

Background concerning congressional action and the aftermath is presented in
supra note 10, at 122-31. In 1975 the SEC approved amendments to
the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice which established various ceilings for loads. See SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 8980 (October 10, 1975).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(a) (1970).
75. 19 Ill. App. 2d 513, 154 N.E.2d 837 (1958).
76. See Statement of Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., supra note 43, at 8.
77. Moreover, in the case of the Broad Street Group, the SEC specifically authorized load
funds*to charge assets for distribution costs. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(b) (1970).
79. Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 112 (1940) (emphasis added).
80. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
DISTRIBUTION REPORT,
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Section 12(d)(3)

Another argument in favor of allowing assets to be used to pay for
marketing costs is built around section 12(d)(3)8" of the 1940 Act.
That provision makes it unlawful for a fund, inter alia, to own stock
in an underwriter unless the underwriter's stock is owned entirely
by one or more funds and unless the underwriter is "primarily engaged" in the business of underwriting or selling securities. This
section thus implies that a fund's assets may be used to participate
in the ownership of an underwriter which markets the fund's shares.
It would seem that if it is legal for a fund to control marketing effort
by controlling its underwriter via stock ownership, it likewise should
be legal for a fund to be its own underwriter and pay marketing costs
directly out of assets. 2
THE REAL ISSUES: INDEPENDENCE, FULL DISCLOSURE AND DUE CARE

Background
None of the foregoing arguments premised on the 1940 Act is
sufficiently compelling to terminate debate. Presumably, if the SEC
staff truly believed that its arguments were dispositive, it never
would have granted the Armstrong Associates and Mutual Liquid
Assets no-action letters." The arguments on the industry's side of
the fence are premised largely on innuendo and a snippet or two of
legislative history. Such arguments are better than none at all, but
not by much.
What really appears to bother the staff and the Commission is the
prospect of abuse of fund shareholders if the Commission were to
give advisers carte blanche to dip into assets to stimulate sales.8 As
81. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(3) (1970).
82. For a no-action letter authorizing a fund to serve as its own underwriter, see SEC NoAction Letter to First Safe Fund (Dec. 8, 1971) [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] MuT. FUNDS
9376.
GUIDE (CCH)
83. It is germane to note that in an amicus brief filed in 1976 in connection with a
brokerage recapture case, the Commission admitted:
There is no specific provision in the [1940] Act . . .that would explicitly remove
the decision on recapture from the discretion of the board of directors. While this
factor is not dispositive, it does indicate that Congress did not believe that the
potential for abuse in this type of decision was sufficient to warrant statutory
removal of the matter from the board of directors' discretion.
Brief of the SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 35, Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977). The court in Tannenbaum ultimately agreed with the SEC's
analysis. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 417 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421
(1977). The SEC's assessment-of the Act's coverage as to board recapture decisions quoted
above seems equally applicable to the Act's impact on the use of assets to pay marketing
costs.
84. The situation has been correctly stated by one industry member as follows:
Much of the problem involved in determining the extent to which fund assets
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noted earlier, new sales automatically benefit the adviser if the
advisory fee is based on assets, as most are. Much less clear is the
nature and extent of any advantages flowing to existing fund shareholders whose money is risked in the marketing campaign. To be
sure, there are checks on director and investment adviser overreaching in sections 15" and 3686 of the 1940 Act. Simply put, the Commission does not trust the system to prevent this form of abuse.
Section 15 provides for review of underwriting and advisory contracts by disinterested directors and fund shareholders. Neither
group has been viewed by the Commission as providing an especially effective check on adviser overreaching." Section 36(a) authorizes SEC suits in cases involving breaches of fiduciary duty
may be used for distribution purposes derives from the fact that the Act does not
contain express comprehensive provisions which specify what constitutes proper
fees or expenses for investment companies. While the staff has cited a number of
provisions in the Act as being applicable . . . most of the opposition to distribution
fees or expenses has been based upon the general fiduciary standards embodied in
the Act.
Mr. Mostoff [then Director of the Division of Investment Management] in his
letter with respect to the Lionel D. Edie Ready Assets Trust distrbution fee stated:
Investment companies are, by and large, merely pools of money to which
many individuals have contributed so that their individual participations
may be invested in securities or held for investment, in common and under
a common management. Any use of an investment company's assets for
purposes not necessary to that function may, therefore, be impermissible. In
this connection, our concern focuses on the trustee's duty of loyalty, that is,
his obligation to act solely in the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust.
Were fund assets to be used as you proposed, it is difficult to see how this
obligation could be satisfied in view of the benefit that would be afforded
the investment adviser from the arrangement.
The other sections in the Act cited by the Commission in objecting to distribution expenditures have largely been speculative secondary arguments and are not
absolute impediments against the use of fund assets for distribution purposes.
Statement of Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., supra note 43, at 6-7.
The staff apparently is no longer adhering to the questionable premise, stated in the
quotation above, that the common law of trusts defines the scope of an investment adviser's
fiduciary duty to fund shareholders. See Jones, supra note 62, at 18.
The legislative history of the 1940 Act suggests that the drafters did not intend for investment company managers to be held to the standard applicable to a trustee. See 1940 Senate
Hearings, supra note 62, at 262 (testimony of David Schenker). See also Brown v. Bullock,
194 F. Supp. 207, 241 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). There is no evidence
that the drafters of the 1970 amendments to the 1940 Act meant to establish trusteeship as
the standard for measuring an adviser's fiduciary duty.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
86. Id. § 80a-35.
87. See, e.g., PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 15, at 148-49; Goldberg, Disinterested
Directors, Independent Directors and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 Loy. CHI.
L.J. 565, 571-73 (1978); Address by Roderick M. Hills, entitled, The Investment Company
Board: Myth vs. Reality, ALI-ABA Meeting (Nov. 11, 1976) reprinted in 2 MUT. FUNDS GUIDE
(CCH)
10,405, at 13,718 [hereinafter cited as Hills Address].
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"involving personal misconduct" by fund officers, directors, advisers or underwriters, and section 36(b) provides a cause of action that
can be asserted by the Commission or by a mistreated mutual fund
(directly or derivatively) to recover payments made where the recipient has breached its fiduciary duty to the fund with respect to such
payments."
If the staff viewed sections 15 and 36 as effective deterrents to
overreaching in the area under consideration, then presumably it
would not have been so quick to advance some of the flimsy claims
in favor of absolute prohibition that were reviewed earlier. On the
other hand, one suspects that if the industry were confident of its
ability to defend section 36 actions successfully, there would be
much greater overt use of fund assets to finance marketing of fund
shares than now exists.
Tannenbaum and Business Judgment
Obviously, fund managements overwhelmingly endorse the view
that the use of fund assets to aid distribution is legal, and that its
legality should be officially declared in an SEC rule or interpretive
release. Three arguments supporting the fund industry's position
were noted earlier,89 but from a qualitative standpoint, they are not
nearly as strong as the basic claim that fund directors do not necessarily breach their fiduciary duty by agreeing to pay marketing costs
from assets. The heart of this claim is the premise that use of assets
to assist distribution is to be decided by the fund's disinterested
directors (those who are not affiliated with the adviser) in the exercise of their business judgment and after full disclosure to them of
all material facts. This business judgment argument stems from the
Second Circuit's recent decision in Tannenbaum v. Zeller.9 ° The
case involved, in part, the question whether a fund's directors acted
properly in deciding to forego recapture of brokerage commissions
where the commissions were allocated in part to stimulate sales of
fund shares. In Tannenbaum the SEC as amicus took the position
that the adviser and the defendant interested director did not vio88. By its terms, § 36(b) gives a right of civil action to recover unreasonable compensation. Section 36(a) has been read to support an implied right of civil recovery for breaches of
fiduciary duty by the fund's adviser. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 417 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977); Brief of the SEC as Amicus Curiae, supra note 83, at 27
n.36. But see Monheit v. Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The extent of an
implied right of civil recovery for a violation of § 15 is unclear. Compare Brown v. Bullock,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) with Halligan v. Standard & Poor's Intercapital Income Securities,
Inc., 2 MUT. FUNDS GUIDE (CCH) 10,555 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 1977).
89. See text accompanying notes 65, 80 & 82 supra.
90. 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
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late their fiduciary duty to the fund if the decision was approved by
the fund's disinterested directors and if the disinterested directors:
"(1) were not dominated or unduly influenced by the investment
adviser; (2) were fully informed [of all material facts]; and (3) fully
aware [of all material facts] reached a reasonable business decision
. . .after a thorough review of all relevant factors."'" The appellate
court adopted the test, found each prong to be satisfied, and upheld
the lower court's ruling" that fiduciary duty had not been breached.
The appellate court, however, did find a violation of rule 14a-9
arising from a failure to make full disclosure of the recapture opportunity in proxy statements sent to shareholders. 3
The Independence Requirement
While Tannenbaum undeniably lends credence to the industry's
argument that the use of assets for distribution is fundamentally
a business' judgment matter, it by no means guarantees that the
practice will withstand a challenge. For one thing, the independence
of disinterested fund directors has long been the subject of derision,9 4 and one senior SEC official recently charged that even today
"a lot of" legally disinterested directors are in fact dominated by the
investment adviser. This is a serious allegation since disinterested
directors are supposed to serve a watchdog function for the protection of the fund's shareholders."
91. Id. at 418-19 & n.24.
92. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 399 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd in part, 552 F.2d 402
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
93. 552 F.2d 402, 429-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
94. See Survey, supra note 9, at 906-07, 915-16; Hills Address, note 87 supra; Brief of the
SEC as Amicus Curiae, supra note 83, at 37. "Our experience is that rarely are the independent directors truly independent of domination by the adviser." In a footnote, the SEC's brief
offered this opinion: "Our experience with respect to the question of actual independence of
directors leads us to suggest that the burden of demonstrating independence of action be a
heavy and convincing one on the defendant." Id. at 37 n.47. See also Lasker v. Burks,
[Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 282 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 1978) (holding that,
as a matter of law, disinterested mutual fund directors lack authority to terminate a nonfrivolous derivative suit attacking the conduct of the fund's interested directors and investment adviser).
95. Jones, supra note 62, at 18.
96. These non-affiliated directors have a demanding mission and that is the
protection of the assets of Fund and the shareholders. Their position in relation to
Management is adversary in character, and if they are to properly fulfill their
mission they are obligated to scrutinize the acts and doings of the adviser with great
care.
Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 550 (D. Colo. 1963). Accord, Tannenbaum v. Zeller,
552 F.2d 402, 406, 417 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977); Papilsky v. Berndt, [19731976 Transfer Binder] MuT. FUNDS GUIDE (CCH) 10,309, at 13,563, 13,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Deutch, Fogel v. Chestnutt: The Meaning of an Opinion, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 375, 386 (1977).
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The matter of domination obviously is a factual question. One
factor a court might want to consider is whether the disinterested
directors were nominated by the directors affiliated with the adviser. 7 A demonstrable history of directorial independence of the
adviser would also be relevant, as would proof of consultation by the
disinterested directors with independent experts, including independent counsel, prior to reaching a decision. 8 The need for retention of outside experts would be especially great where the outside
directors are not sophisticated in business or investment matters.9
Evaluation and decision-making by the disinterested directors out
97. See Lasker v. Burks, [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 282 (2d Cir.
Jan. 11, 1978).
98. Conflict of interest problems are presented when one law firm endeavors simultaneously to serve the fund's adviser and its board. See Papilsky v. Berndt, [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] MUT. FUNDS GUIDE (CCH) 10,309, at 13,563, 13,575 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
In Tannenbaum, one firm represented all sides to the bargaining. The SEC's amicus brief
pronounced the Commission "troubled" by counsel's dual representation. Brief of the SEC
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 83, at 42 n.52. But fortunately for counsel, the appellate court
was able to find that "counsel correctly advised the independent directors as to the applicable
law and the necessity for reaching a reasonable business judgment ....
" Tannenbaum v.
Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 428 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977). Former SEC Chairman
Hills summarized the Commission's position on the subject of independence thus:
"Unquestionably, the outside directors should be urged to engage separate counsel for the
fund, at least for some matters." Hills Address, supra note 87, at 13,719.
Independent legal advice is not the only type of outside expertise that may be useful to
the independent directors. A recent application to the SEC by Investors Diversified Services,
Inc. mentions in a footnote that the disinterested directors of IDS's funds retained the management consulting firm of Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. to review a plan designed to restructure the system used to market the funds' shares. See Amendment No. 1 to SEC Application
of Investors Diversified Services, Inc., Pursuant to Section 17(d) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, at 32 (Sept. 12, 1977). See also Goldberg, supra note 87, at 585.
99. The relevance of sophistication in determining independence is made clear by the
lower court's ruling in Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 369
(1st Cir. 1971):
In approving the contract the unaffiliated directors acted wholly independently
of the affiliated directors and at meetings not attended by the latter. Each unaffiliated director was a man of maturity, experience in the world of finance or commerce, reputation extending beyond provincial limits, vigorous mind, and strength
of character. None of them was subservient to [the advisor's personnel] or anyone
else connected with this case.
316 F. Supp. at 52. The appellate court did not disturb the trial court's finding of independence. See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 371 n.1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
The lower court in Tannenbaum pointed out that the "disinterested Fund directors are men
of repute in academia, business and the professions." Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 399 F. Supp.
945, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The appellate court in Tannenbaum observed that "[alt the trial,
appellant never seriously challenged the factual independence" of the disinterested directors.
Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
See Goldberg, supra note 87, at 583-84 for further discussion of sophistication as a
criterion for independence on the part of mutual fund directors. For argument that sophistication is relevant when analyzing potential liability of directors under the securities laws, see
Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., entitled Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, reprinted
in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 79,669, at 83,801, 83,805-06.
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of the presence of the interested directors is also a relevant factor.' ®'
Another would be the extent of services rendered by the adviser to
the fund. As noted earlier, fund advisers historically have rendered
a broad array of operational services to their funds.' 0 ' The practical
independence of a fund's directors may indeed be doubted if, from
an operational standpoint, the adviser "does everything for a fund
' 02
but comb its hair in the morning.'
The Full Disclosure Requirement
Tannenbaum's full disclosure prerequisite is likewise a question
of fact. The adviser and interested directors clearly have the responsibility for identifying and quantifying the economic and practical
pros and cons of a proposal they put forward for approval.' 3 There
is good reason for them to be completely truthful, since there is no
shortage of case law holding that concealment of material facts from
disinterested directors by the fund's adviser and its interested directors constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty actionable under the 1940
Act.' 4 Nondisclosure to shareholders is actionable under rule 14a9, as Tannenbaum itself illustrates.
The Due Care Requirement
In the context of the present problem, the third prong of the
Tannenbaum test presents the biggest hurdle for the fund industry.
Wanting use of fund assets to pay marketing costs to be legal is one
thing; it is another thing to be able to formulate defensible business
100. The circuit court in Tannenbaum and the district court in Moses both mentioned
this fact. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 426-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
421 (1977); Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31, 52 (D. Mass. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 369 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
101. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
102. Jones, supra note 62, at 19.
103. The mandate of the 1940 Act was articulated by the Second Circuit in Fogel v.
Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 749-50 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976):
The minimum requirement to enable the Fund's independent directors to discharge these duties with respect to recapture was a careful investigation of the
possibilities performed with an eye eager to discern them rather than shut against
them, and, if these possibilities were found to be real, a weighing of their legal
difficulties and their economic pros and cons.
A checklist of items that may be considered by a fund board in passing on an advisory
contract is presented in Lipton, Directors of Mutual Funds: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAw.
1259, 1261-62 (1976). A detailed discussion of independent directors' duties in connection with
approval of fund advisory and distribution contracts is presented in Nutt, A Study of Mutual
Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 231-54 (1971).
104. E.g., Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824
(1976); Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d
369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Papilsky v. Berndt [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] MuT. FUNDS GUIDE (CCH) 10,309 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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arguments why the practice is proper. People who buy mutual fund
shares are not philanthropists, they are investors. It is sensible to
argue that their money should be committed by the managers only
to those endeavors that are reasonably likely to yield positive investment returns. Further, from a legal standpoint, prior to approving
a scheme involving use of assets to pay for distribution, the parties
in the conflict of interest position should have the burden of identifying and quantifying the gains expected to be realized by existing
shareholders by risking fund assets on marketing endeavors.0 5 This
data must be evaluated by disinterested directors who must then
independently find, in essence, that the expenditure of assets promises to yield significant tangible benefits to fund shareholders. 08
Assuming the scheme involved substantial modification of an advisory contract, implementation would require shareholder approval
after full disclosure.0 7 Obviously, implementation of any subsidization program would require constant monitoring by the disinterested directors to assure that adequate tangible benefits are being
realized by existing investors.0 8
Many business arguments have been advanced in support of the
idea that fund shareholders benefit from new sales. One argument
is that increased sales can lead to increased size, with resultant
105. Cf. Brudney, A Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1037 (1975) (discussing
the majority's duty in a going private case). This burden should not be confused with the
burden of proving nonviolation of a fiduciary duty in the event of a later suit. Under § 36(b)
of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b)(1) (1970), "the plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving a breach of fiduciary duty."
106. A former Director of the Commission's Division of Investment Management had this
to say about the exercise of due care in director decision-making:
With regard to whether shareholders benefit from increased sales of shares, I'm not
sure we can say much more than that it is a question of judgment, that the answer
might vary from fund to fund and from time to time, and that it is up to each fund's
directors to figure out the answer in a particular case.
Of course, leaving this decision up to the directors puts a tremendous burden
on them. If they come up with the wrong answer, they could be very sorry. If I were
a fund director in this situation, there are two things I would do. First, I would worry
a lot. Second, when the advisor came to me with a recommendation that the fund
bear distribution expenses, I would ask him for enough justification and supporting
data to choke a horse.
I would study it all, and then send him back for more. This burden on directors
might not be entirely fair, but it might help ensure that in deciding whether a fund
should pay for distribution, the disinterested directors will also be independent
directors.
Jones, supra note 62, at 19.
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970); cf. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D.
Colo. 1963).
108. The value and importance of periodic review by a fund board is discussed in Lipton,
supra note 103, at 1261.
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economies of scale manifested in a lower expense ratio.10 The main
deficiency with this claim is that even if economies were certain to
result, expansion still would not be justifiable unless there was a
reasonable likelihood that the savings realized would more than
offset the cost of capital used to achieve them. Another line of argument is based on the idea that fund shareholders will benefit from
new sales because an inflow of cash into a fund assists portfolio
management, making it easier to achieve good investment performance."" Similarly, it is argued that growth helps fund management
attract and keep good people who supposedly will yield superior
performance."' There are three major weaknesses with the claim
that a net cash inflow benefits fund shareholders. First, the premise
has no empirical support."2 Funds with net cash inflows have not
been shown to out-perform closed-end funds or funds experiencing
net redemptions."' Second, the premise is logically deficient. No
fund can expect to have net sales forever. At some point growth
must level off." 4 Third, it has been asserted that growth and prosperity in the fund industry is a function of superior investment
performance and effective shareholder service."' If this is so, fund
managements already have it within their power to grow without
dipping further into shareholders' pockets.
Another industry argument for use of assets for distribution costs
is that payments for distribution are a necessary part of fund owner109. E.g., Statement of Investors Diversified Services, SEC File No. 4-186, at 6-8 (Dec.
1, 1976); Statement of Putnam Management Co., Inc., SEC File No. 4-186, at 1-2 (Dec. 2,
1976); Statement of the Vanguard Group, supra note 10, at 4-5.
110. E.g., Statement of Investors Diversified Services, Inc., supra note 109, at 2-5.
111. Statement of the Vanguard Group, supra note 10, at 4; Statement of Waddell &
Reed, Inc., supra note 55, at 10.
112. See Jones, supra note 62, at 18-19.
113. See generally The Redeemers, FORBES, June 15, 1971, at 70-71; Statement of T. Rowe
Price Associates, Inc., SEC File No. 4-186, at 2 (Dec. 27, 1976); Statement of the Vanguard
Group, supra note 10, at 5-6.
114. See Freeman, supra note 23, at 104 n.321. Regarding the consequences of issuing a
redeemable security, the Department of Justice has argued that
there is nothing sacrosanct about preventing redemptions from exceeding sales. The
guaranteed redemption feature of mutual funds is a strong selling point and funds
should be willing to accept the burdens of this feature as well as the benefits. If
enough investors do not have sufficient confidence in a fund to retain their shares
they should redeem them, even if this forces the fund to liquidate some of its
portfolio. This is entirely consistent with the economic policy of free competition
and it is unlikely to produce market chaos. The argument that such liquidation
always would hurt the remaining shareholders is plainly unsound since that effect
depends on whether the stocks liquidated subsequently performed better or worse
than the remainder of the fund's portfolio.
Statement of the United States Department of Justice, SEC File No. 4-164, at 18 (Feb. 2,
1973).
115. E.g., Statement of the Putnam Companies, SEC File No. 4-172, at 5 (Aug. 21, 1974).
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ship, because the redeemable nature of fund shares means that a
fund which does not continuously distribute eventually will be redeemed out of business."' This argument is persuasive as to the noload segment of the industry, where assets are the only source of
funds for marketing. It has less force with respect to the load funds.
The sales load ceiling in section 22(b) of the Act presents a serious
problem, and it would seem that, in the absence of prospectus disclosure at the time of investment, shareholders of such funds legitimately can argue they were led to believe they paid a one-time tax
for marketing costs when they bought their load fund shares." 7
Moreover, if direct appropriation of assets to pay marketing costs
is essential to the viability of the load fund segment of the industry,
how did the load funds grow to over $40 billion without engaging in
the practice?
Another possible justification for using assets to pay for marketing has been overlooked by proponents of the practice. This argument starts with the premise that fund shareholders, "like purchasers of homes, automobiles, and major appliances,""' experience
post-purchase anxiety. Negative post-purchase feelings, which may
be based on adverse publicity, may prompt a fund purchaser to seek
to return the product by redeeming." 9 This would be a foolish deci116. E.g., Statement of the Investment Company Institute, supra note 5, at 15; Statement
of Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., supra note 43, at 4. The Justice Department
certainly sees no reason why liquidation should be prevented. See note 114 supra.
117. There are, of course, various ways assets of a fund could be used to pay distribution
costs. One way would be for continuing compensation payments to be made to fund dealers.
This was the approach used for years by one of the Axe-Houghton load funds. See text
accompanying notes 28, 35 supra. It was also the approach advanced by Armstrong Associates
and Mutual Liquid Assets in their no-action requests. A solid analysis of the problems posed
by continuing compensation fees is presented in Statement of Waddell & Reed, Inc., supra
note 55, at 7-9. At the Distribution Hearings, the Investment Company Institute's spokesman
did not argue forcefully that continuing compensation arrangements were permissible under
the 1940 Act. See Official Transcript of Proceedings 28 (testimony of David Silver). Another
party to the proceedings took the position that existing funds could lawfully impose a continuing compensation charge against assets as to all shareholders, not just new ones, and that
failure to treat all shareholders the same could result in a violation of § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-18(f) (1970) (which outlaws issuance of "any class of senior security"). Merrill Lynch
Asset Management, Inc., supra note 43, at 21. Still another party to the proceedings argued,
along the lines of the text, that "[iut is difficult to justify charging the shareholders of
existing funds for costs which they believed were covered by the sales charge they paid when
they bought their shares." Statement of Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc., SEC File No. 4186, at 8 (Dec. 1, 1976). For a description of proposed corporate action submitted for SEC
approval, which aims to saddle fund shareholders with a continuing charge, see Application
of Investors Diversified Services, Inc., supra note 98. The effect of the proposal on existing
load fund shareholders is discussed in id. at 33-35.
118. P. KorLER,MARKETING MANAGEMENT 135 (2d ed. 1972).
119. A discussion of post-purchase anxiety, or "cognitive dissonance," in the context of
mutual fund and life insurance marketing is presented in Freeman, supra note 23, at 54-56,
91 & n.281.
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sion if the investor ends up with a less suitable product than what
he or she began with. Thus, it might be defensible for fund directors
to commit a portion of assets to fund or trade association-sponsored
promotional campaigns aimed at keeping fund investors from making imprudent switches of their investments. As a popular marketing text states:
The existence of possible negative post-purchase feelings indicates that the marketer might profit from directing some of his
communications to the recent buyer .

.

. The recent buyer may

need assurance that he has made the right choice. If he is in a
dissonant state, he will be looking for supportive evidence in the
form of advertising and other communications. The [marketer]
may take the opportunity of building assurances into the information brochures that accompany his product. [Marketers] also can
run advertisements showing recent purchasers showing satisfaction with their choice and why. Unless the seller dispels the dissonance by
some positive efforts, he may lose the customer unneces20
sarily. ,

A case can be made for some use of fund assets to finance promotional schemes aimed at bolstering the confidence of fund shareholders in the product they have bought. This might forestall unsuitable switches by some shareholders. The promotional effort may
also generate new sales to fund investors and others. In fact, fund
shareholders themselves comprise a very attractive target market
for new sales.' 2 ' Assuming the promotional effort is truly intended
to function as a shareholder service and that suitability requirements are met, the fact that new sales result would not seem objectionable.
It should be noted that two questionable premises support use of
assets to pay for promotional efforts directed toward existing shareholders. First, it is by no means certain that the number of share120. P. KomE, supra note 118, at 135.
121. Consider this admission by Investors Diversified Services, Inc., concerning the mutual funds in its complex: "In recent years approximately 80 percent of the dollar amount of
Fund sales (excluding reinvested dividends) have been made to existing Fund shareholders.
Such shareholders constitute approximately 10 percent of the total number of shareholder
accounts." Application of Investors Diversified Services, supra note 98, at 34. The full magnitude of IDS's reliance on sales to its own shareholders is seen by considering that total sales
in 1976 were $209,000,000 (excluding reinvested dividends and underwriter fees and including
amounts invested for continental plans). Reinvested dividends generated a cash inflow for
shares of $167,000,000. The total inflow for 1976 was thus approximately $376,000,000, of
which approximately $334,000,000 ($167,000,000 + 80% x $209,000,000) or 89%, was generated by IDS funds' shareholders. See id. at 26. The Vanguard group reports that in 1976
approximately 50% of fund sales, excluding dividend reinvestments, were to existing shareholders. See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 9850 (July 15, 1977), at 3.
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holders who stand to be benefited by dissonance reduction can be
known or reasonably estimated. Second, a board can by no means
be certain that dispelling shareholder dissonance will result in a net
gain to shareholders. If the expenditure causes nonredemption by
shareholders who otherwise would have redeemed and earned a better return elsewhere, the payment for anxiety-reducing ads would
amount to money spent on a shareholder disservice.
Summary
The best argument in favor of allowing the use of fund assets to
pay marketing costs is that the SEC really cannot prove the practice
is automatically illegal under the 1940 Act. Indeed, the Commission
was willing to agree that the use of recapturable brokerage commissions to generate sales was valid in Tannenbaum.122 It is not a big
jump from that position to allowing the direct use of assets to pay
marketing costs. The industry can well argue that the business judgment of a fund's disinterested directors, not the iron will of a regulatory agency, should control the issue of how the fund's assets are
allocated. Tannenbaum certainly lends support to this view, but it
only opens the door. The business judgment of the disinterested
directors deserves to be sustained only if it is reasonably exercised
after full disclosure. To date, no hard evidence has been adduced
to show that the allocation of assets to pay for distribution of load
funds is really cost-effective or a prudent use of existing shareholders' money. On the other hand, it deserves mention that the court
in Tannenbaum apparently did rely on the dubious economies of
scale and performance arguments to support its decision to uphold
the reasonableness of the practice.2 3 Fund directors and attorneys
122. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 428 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421
(1977). In its amicus brief the Commission took the position that the question of reasonableness on the part of the board was a close one. The SEC judged "persuasive" the argument
that, "in view of the competitive consideration arising from the virtually universal use in the
industry of excess commissions to pay for sales," the directors acted prudently in deciding
that increased sales would be beneficial to the fund's shareholders. Brief of SEC as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 83, at 52.
123. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 427-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421
(1977). Furthermore, it may be noted that the SEC itself has recognized the possibility that
increased size can benefit a fund. See PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 15, at 180:
[Uinder present industry compensation patterns increases in fund size result in
increased advisory compensation. The funds and their shareholders, however, benefit only to the extent that fund growth reduces advisory fees and other operating
costs or enables fund managers to build a stronger advisory organization. To the
shareholders of some small funds these benefits could be substantial; to shareholders of larger funds and to the shareholders of those smaller funds which belong to
large complexes, they may be less significant.
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should anticipate that business judgment evidence will be more
closely analyzed in future cases.
The SEC's chief worry to date has been the conflict of interest
posed by the coupling of external management with advisory fees
based on a percentage of total assets. The staff has indicated that
it may be more willing to approve schemes using assets for marketing costs where the affected funds have a complete internalization
of management or where the external adviser is compensated either
on a fixed sum basis or on performance.' While the Commission's
concern over the conflict of interest problem is easy to understand,
it is not easy to see why directors of externally managed funds
having percentage-of-assets advisory fees should be viewed as incompetent to decide whether their funds will bear marketing costs.
After all, they clearly are competent to decide-in their business
judgment-whether to approve a direct rate hike for the adviser, or
whether to change to a more expensive adviser. And it is by no
means uncommon for a fund to agree to an increase in its advisory
fee; in fact, since 1972, no fewer than ninety-one mutual funds have
done so."5

The SEC's proposed requirement of internalized management, a
performance fee, or a fixed fee may purify the decision-making process from a conflict of interest standpoint, but these supposed safeguards do not immunize a board's decision from attack on due care
grounds. No matter how disinterested the board is, its action is
defensible only if the perceived benefits are carefully identified,
quantified, and evaluated in advance of approval. If implemented,
the marketing program must be carefully monitored, and if net
gains for shareholders fail to materialize, the practice must cease.
THE HIDDEN ISSUE: ONGOING NONDISCLOSURE

It was noted earlier that the use of assets to pay fund marketing
costs is a matter of everyday life in the fund industry. Both the
industry and the SEC know it. The SEC generally has been willing
to look the other way, rationalizing that marketing costs are paid
26
not out of shareholders' savings but out of "advisers' profits."'
124. See Jones, supra note 62, at 19. Performance fees are now regulated by § 205 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970).

125. See Proposed Vanguard Statement, supra note 18, at 4 & Exhibit 1-1.
126. E.g., Statement of Merrill Lynch.Asset Management, Inc., supra note 43, at 11,
quoting a former director of the SEC's Division of Investment Management as follows:
[W]e see a real distinction between a fund paying for sales activities directly from
its net assets and paying an investment adviser a fee for investment advice and
management services, where the adviser may use part of that fee to pay for distribu-
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When fund sales were booming in the 1950's and 1960's, there was
no great concern over the practice, for the good reason that marketing activity on behalf of funds generally was profitable, or at least
not very unprofitable.
The fund industry has claimed persistently that the SEC should
revise its traditional position because the circumstances of the industry have changed, i.e., fund shares are harder to sell, costs are
up, and losses on marketing activity are devouring advisers' profit
margins.'27 The SEC staff's 1974 report on mutual fund distribution
described instances of increased reliance on advisory revenues to
support marketing effort, 2 ' and more recent written admissions are
on file at the SEC.'29 What the 1974 report failed to focus on, and
what the SEC to date has ignored, are questions such as: When does
this allocation of advisers' profits become so material as to require
disclosure under section 15 of the 1940 Act and rule 14a-9 of the 1934
Act? When subsidization of marketing effort consumes twenty percent of the management fee? Thirty percent? Fifty percent? Ninety
percent? Never? Is it not possible for the same entity to provide a
fund with both excellent investment advice and profligate marketing programs? How can the directors ascertain whether the fund is
obtaining fair value in each area unless costs are broken down and
analyzed in detail? How can a board weigh the advisability of
switching distributors, or of internalizing distribution, or of discontinuing marketing of new shares, unless it knows the extent to which
marketing is a drain on assets? What are the consequences of nondisclosure of the use of a material portion of the management fee to
subsidize distribution costs?
In Tannenbaum, the Second Circuit accepted that the adviser
and the defendant affiliated director "were under a duty of full
disclosure . . . to these unaffiliated directors in every area where
there was even a possible conflict of interest between their interests
and the interests of the fund."' ' Whenever fund assets are claimed
tion efforts ....
[W]e understand that many fund sponsors incur a distribution
deficit in the hope of improving their advisory profits .
The staff's 1974 DIsmMUTIoN REPORT observed that:
The notion of a distribution system which is, in itself, not profitable seems to
have become accepted as a fact of life by the mutual fund industry, and more and
more complexes have been forced to finance essential wholesaling services and the
sale of fund shares out of the profits generated from investment advisory fees. ...
DISmTIBUTION REPORT, supra note 10, at 31.
127. E.g., Statement of Investment Company Institute, supra note 5, at 16-18.
128. See DIsmTRmuiON REPORT, supra note 10, at 20, 31-33.
129. See text accompanying note 44 supra. See also Statement of the Vanguard Group,
supra note 10, at 11.
130. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977)
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by the adviser, there is an inherent conflict of interest and, under
Tannenbaum, a duty of full disclosure as to how those assets are to
be used. Full disclosure to shareholders is necessary when a contract
is modified to allow payments of assets to finance marketing effort.' 3' This duty of full disclosure for the benefit of fund shareholders is mentioned in the preamble of the 1940 Act, which declares
"that the national public interest and the interest of investors are
adversely affected-(1) when investors . . . vote . . securities issued by investment companies without adequate, accurate, and
explicit information, fairly presented, concerning . . . the circumstances, policies, and financial responsibility of such companies and
their management .
*...
,,13Furthermore, the full disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act cannot be ignored. As noted earlier,
Tannenbaum itself upheld a rule 14a-9 claim based on nondisclosure of material facts.
A case can be made that the use of assets to subsidize marketing
effort in the fund industry presents an example of "creeping materiality," whereby increasing indulgence in an initially insignificant
practice eventually leads to conduct that must be disclosed.'3 In(quoting from Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971)).
131. This presumes that such action would substantially change the existing advisory
contract. See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 540-41 (D. Colo. 1963). But see SEC
No-Action Letter to Armstrong Associates Inc., (Aug. 19, 1975) and accompanying correspondence.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1) (1970).
133. An omitted material fact is defined as material for purposes of rule 14a-9 litigation
in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976):
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote. . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available.
Another way of looking at the ambit of the duty to give information is presented in the
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY:

Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to
give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and
which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which can
be communicated without violating a superior duty to a third person.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY

§ 381 (1958).

It has been suggested that a fund board called on to approve an advisory contract would
want to focus on such things as: "the actual amount of all compensation paid to the advisor;
the expenses incurred by the advisor attributable to the fund and the general profitability to
the advisor of its services to the fund ...." Lipton, supra note 103, at 1261-62. This suggests
that the fact and extent of distribution losses paid for by the advisor out of its fee are well
worth the attention of the independent directors. Similarly, former SEC Chairman Hills
implicitly recognized the need for furnishing detailed financial disclosure to the independent
directors when he said: "In the course of reviewing the advisory and underwriting arrangements, the directors surely must consider whether there are viable alternatives-including
'internalizing' the management of the fund .... " Hills Address, supra note 87, at 13,720.
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herent in the Mutual Liquid Assets no-action request was the affirmation that the fund was able to charge the customary advisory fee,
render competent investment advice for a profit, and still give up
half of its management fee to pay for marketing costs. The application implied that other such funds were doing the same thing, without being as candid about it. If the implication is true, then the SEC
would do well to stop using its "advisory profits" euphemism when
it is referring to surreptitious siphoning of assets to pay marketing
costs. At one time this diversion may have been insignificant, and
the euphemism apt, but the times have changed, and a formerly
insignificant practice seems to have taken on major importance. If
so, fund advisers who fail to disclose their use of substantial sums
of assets to pay marketing costs are running a serious risk of liability
under section 36 of the 1940 Act and rule 14a-9 of the 1934 Act.' u
The SEC would do well to make this clear to the fund industry.
CONCLUSION

It has been claimed that the SEC has authority under the 1940
Act "to permit, prohibit or limit the use of mutual fund assets to
pay distribution expenses.""' Like a number of the claims made in
the course of the debate discussed herein, this one is hyperbole, at
least to the extent it insinuatesthat the Commission has authority
under the 1940 Act automatically to bar any internally managed noload fund from distributing its own shares and bearing reasonable
3
costs in connection with that activity.'
See also Note, Duties of the Independent Directorin Open-End Mutual Funds, 70 MIcH. L.
REV. 696 (1972) (positing different duties to be discharged by disinterested directors, including the "duty to review regularly the feasibility of internalizing fund management").
134. At least one member of the mutual fund industry seems to recognize this fact:
Because the use of fund assets for distribution purposes directly or indirectly
raises questions with respect to the fiduciary standards in the Act and because such
expenditures indirectly benefit the investment adviser to the extent new sales are
created, full disclosure of any such arrangement should be required in both the
annual proxy material and the currently effective prospectus of the fund. A failure
to make full disclosure of policies in this area may constitute a fraudulent practice.
Statement of Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., supra note 43, at 21-22.
135. Jones, supra note 62, at 18.
136. There is not the slightest trace of evidence that the drafters of the 1940 Act meant
to discourage the operation of such a fund. Indeed, the indications are the other way. See
1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 62, at 235 (testimony of David Schenker) (observing that
self-distribution of shares by a fund may be a "model situation"). Consider the force of this
defense of internalization of distribution:
In the mutual fund industry today. . . the advisory and management fees paid
by mutual funds are the source for the payment of distribution costs. If it is illegal
for these costs to be "unbundled" and charged directly to the fund . . .it follows
as a matter of elementary logic that a mutual fund is required to retain an external
adviser. For if distribution is essential, and if it cannot be financed directly and
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The mutual fund industry is a marketing industry. Control over
marketing decisions rests primarily with the board of directors of
each fund. The major SEC concern is that many fund boards are
too incompetent, or corrupt, or corruptible to make decisions that
other boards of directors may properly make.'37 If the goblins the
SEC sees are real, one wonders why the SEC's enforcement machinery is not humming and why the SEC has no legislative proposals pending before Congress to upgrade the quality of fund boards.
The truth is that the 1940 Act vests the SEC with far-reaching regulatory and enforcement power, and the SEC has been the dominant
force on the fund scene for nearly forty years. If fund managements
generally are not competent or trustworthy today, then why does
the SEC tolerate the status quo? In truth, in the debate considered
here, the SEC's lack of candor and its vacillation set a poor example
for any group having a leadership role.
If it believes that fund managements generally are competent and
trustworthy, the SEC should make it plain that the sensible threeprong approach of Tannenbaum is the pertinent test with respect
to use of fund assets to pay marketing costs. Whether the Commission decides to go the Tannenbaum route or to continue its past
practice of selectively authorizing certain funds to charge assets
directly for distribution costs, it would do well to enunciate in a
release the factors independent directors should consider when deciding whether to implement or continue a marketing program financed by fund assets. In light of past pronouncements by Commission personnel and recent case law, it must be expected that anyone
willing to serve as a disinterested director for a mutual fund will be
anxious to have all the guidance the SEC can furnish.
separately, then it can only be financed indirectly, by being "bundled up" with the
advisory fee. But if the law requires the retention of an external adviser, we have
never heard a single commentator suggest it. If this is what the law requires, the
ability of a mutual fund to negotiate with its adviser, or to replace its adviser if
necessary and appropriate, has been seriously impaired. And if this is what the law
requires, the ability of a fund to fully internalize its operations-to operate its own
business, if you will, rather than by contracting out essential functions to external
organizations-has been totally eliminated.
Proposed Vanguard Statement, supra note 18, at 13. See also Letter from SEC Staff to Carl
L. Shipley, (May 29, 1975), reprinted in [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] Mtrr. FUNDS GUtDE
(CCH)
10,203; Letter from SEC Staff to Steadman Security Corp., (May 22, 1975),
reprinted in [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] Mur. FUNDs GUIDE (CCH) 10,201; note 82 supra.
137. Case law from the Second Circuit supports the proposition that mutual fund directors are not competent to take at least one type of action that directors of industrial corporations properly may take, i.e., terminating a non-frivolous derivative suit. Compare Lasker v.
Burks, [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,282 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 1978) with Gall
v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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One noteworthy area where SEC guidance is needed is that of
disclosure requirements concerning the ongoing appropriation of
fund assets to support marketing activities. "Advisers' profits" once
may have been a reasonable way of describing one source of cash to
pay marketing costs. But "creeping materiality" appears to have set
in, and advisers who choose continued nondisclosure of the use they
make of substantial sums of shareholders' money do so at their peril.

